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Traditional choice of law analysis presupposes that deciding
cases with multistate contacts is a two-step process: first one
"chooses" the law that governs the dispute, then one "applies" the
chosen law. The second step involves the familiar process of inter-
preting law to determine the parties' rights in the dispute. The dif-
ficulty lies in the first step of the process: choosing the applicable
law. Under traditional choice of law analysis, this choice is directed
by "jurisdiction-selecting rules,"1 which operate according to the
nature of the dispute and the locale of some critical event, without
regard to the content of the law in question. Thus, tort cases are
governed by the law of the place where the injury occurred;2 con-
tract cases are governed by either the law of the place where the
contract was made or the law of the place where it was to be per-
formed, depending upon whether the question concerns validity or
performance;3 succession to personalty is determined by the law of
the decedent's domicile;4 and so on.
This traditional approach to choice of law was subjected to
sustained attack throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.1 But while
this criticism successfully undercut the intellectual foundation of
traditional choice of law theory, a plausible alternative was not
proposed until the late 1950s. This alternative-Brainerd Currie's
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I The phrase is from David F. Cavers's well-known article, A Critique of the Choice-of-
Law Problem, 47 Harv L Rev 173, 173 (1933).
2 See, for example, Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws §§ 377-79 (1934).
- Id at §§ 332, 358.
' Id at §§ 303, 306.
' The most powerful and well-known critiques are those of Walter W. Cook, The Logi-
cal and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (Harvard, 1942); Cavers, 47 Harv L Rev 173
(cited in note 1); and Ernest G. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws (Yale,
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"governmental interest analysis1 6 -remains the starting point for
modern choice of law scholarship. Unlike traditional choice of law
theory, the premise of interest analysis is that multistate cases are
not different from ordinary domestic cases, but can also be re-
solved through "the familiar [process] of construction or interpre-
tation."'7 Currie reasoned that laws reflect policy objectives and
that a court should not apply a particular law in a particular case
unless doing so would advance that law's underlying policy-a con-
ventional problem of interpretation. A state is "interested" in hav-
ing its law applied if doing so would advance the state's policy. To
resolve a choice of law question, the court should determine the
policies expressed in the relevant laws, and then analyze how these
policies are configured. If only one state is interested, there is a
"false conflict" and the court should apply that state's law. If more
than one state has an interest, there is a "true conflict" and, ac-
cording to Currie, the court should apply forum law.,
Analyzing state interests leaves some cases unresolved. Inter-
preting the relevant laws, for example, may reveal that no state is
interested in having its law applied; interest analysts call this an
"unprovided-for" case.9 Alternatively, the court may be unable to
determine the relevant state interests and thus unable to classify a
conflict as true or false. 10 According to Currie, the court should ap-
ply its own law in such cases. This is because there is an initial
presumption in favor of forum law: that presumption may be re-
butted if either party shows that some other state is interested, but
' See generally Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke, 1963).
7 See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in id
at 177, 183-84.
8 Currie argued that forum law should apply in true conflict cases because the court has
a duty to advance the policies of its state when its state is interested. Brainerd Currie,
Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in Selected Essays 77,
117-21 (cited in note 6). And in the same collection, see Notes on Methods and Objectives
in the Conflict of Laws 177, 181-82. This proposition, which has proved extremely contro-
versial, is different from the justification for the presumption of forum law, which is based
on the need to find a rule of decision when state interests provide no guidance. See text
accompanying notes 18-20.
See, for example, Erwin v Thomas, 264 Or 454, 506 P2d 494 (1973); Brainerd Currie,
Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, in Selected
Essays 128, 152 (cited in note 6); and Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest Ap-
proach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L Rev 181, 189-90
(1977). I have argued elsewhere that the conclusion that some cases are "unprovided-for" is
based on a mistake in the analysis and that, in fact, there are no such cases. See Larry
Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-For" Case, 75 Va L Rev 1045 (1989).
10 See, for example, Walton v Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F2d 541 (2d Cir 1956);
Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, in Selected Essays 3 (cited
in note 6).
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absent such a showing forum law applies."
So far as I know, this aspect of interest analysis has never
been critically scrutinized-perhaps the only aspect of Currie's ap-
proach about which this can be said. This article contends that the
rebuttable presumption of forum law is, in fact, inconsistent with
Currie's central insight that multistate cases should be resolved by
the same methods as domestic cases. Careful analysis reveals that
the presumption is unnecessary, and that Currie concluded other-
wise only because he neglected his own first principle.
I. THE PRESUMPTION OF FORUM LAW
The precept that there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of
forum law is fundamental to interest analysis. In part, this pre-
sumption is a pleading rule that allocates the burden of raising for-
eign law to the party seeking its benefits. But the presumption of
forum law is also a substantive rule which provides that forum law
ought to govern unless there is good reason to apply some other
state's law. Thus, merely making foreign law an issue does not dis-
sipate the presumption, as would be the case if it were purely a
procedural device. Instead, the party seeking the benefits of for-
eign law must persuade the court that there is an affirmative rea-
son to displace forum law.
To illustrate, consider Walton v Arabian American Oil Co.,12
the case Currie used to develop this idea.-3 Walton presented the
question of who must establish the content of foreign law. A Dela-
ware citizen injured an Arkansas citizen in Saudi Arabia. The
plaintiff sued in New York, alleging that his injuries were proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's negligence. At the close of the
plaintiff's case, the court granted the defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict. The court explained that the plaintiff could not re-
cover under New York law because the accident occurred in Saudi
Arabia; if the plaintiff could recover at all, it must be under Saudi
law. Unfortunately, the court could not determine the plaintiff's
rights under the law of Saudi Arabia, for the court did not know
" Currie, Displacement in Selected Essays at 75 (cited in note 10); and Notes on
Methods in Selected Essays at 183 (cited in note 7). See also Bruce Posnak, Choice of
Law-Rules vs. Analysis: A More Workable Marriage Than the (Second) Restatement; A
Very Well-Curried Leflar Over Reese Approach, 40 Mercer L Rev 869, 876 (1989); Clifford
D. Allo, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Response, 35 Mercer L Rev 565,
567 (1984).
12 233 F2d 541 (2d Cir 1956).
See Currie, Displacement in Selected Essays 3 (cited in note 10).
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the content of Saudi law.14 The court therefore dismissed on the
ground that the plaintiff had the burden of pleading and proving
foreign law.15
Currie objected to this result for two reasons. First, Currie ar-
gued that it makes little sense to treat foreign law as a fact that
must be pleaded and proved to the jury.16 While this objection is
surely correct, it can be cured without a presumption of forum law,
simply by recognizing that the content of foreign law is a question
of law. This would enable the plaintiff to establish foreign law
without formal pleading and proof, by citing appropriate authori-
ties to the court.' 7
But Currie objected to more than the manner in which the
plaintiff was required to establish foreign law: he objected to the
fact that the plaintiff was required to rely on foreign law at all.
According to Currie, the "normal and natural" practice is to pre-
sume that forum law applies unless a party who stands to benefit
from the law of another state shows that this other state has an
interest. 8 As explained above, a state is "interested" if applying its
law in the particular case will advance the state's poli-
cies-something that depends on the content of the state's law. In
Walton, it was clear that New York had no interest in Walton's
case, 9 but since neither party had established the content of Saudi
law, it was not clear whether Saudi Arabia had an interest. For
Currie, this meant that there was no basis for displacing forum law
with the law of Saudi Arabia. He would have allowed the plaintiff
in Walton to recover under New York law, even though New York
had no interest, unless and until the defendant showed that Saudi
14 The plaintiff asserted at oral argument that Saudi Arabia had no law "but only a
dictatorial monarch who decides according to his whim whether a claim like plaintiff's shall
be redressed . ... " Walton, 233 F2d at 545. The plaintiff offered no support for this asser-
tion, however, and the court said that it was "loath to and [would] not believe it, absent
such a showing." Id.
15 Id at 546.
10 Currie, Displacement in Selected Essays at 10-18 (cited in note 10).
17 Although most jurisdictions still treat foreign law as a "fact," this anomaly retains
little practical importance. The pleading issue is generally ignored or cured by amendment,
and the problem of proof is alleviated by statutes that allow courts to take judicial notice of
foreign law. See Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determin-
ing Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 Mich L Rev 613, 624-32 (1967).
Compare Currie, Displacement in Selected Essays at 23-46 (cited in note 10) (criticizing
these statutes).
" Currie, Displacement in Selected Essays at 9, 46-48, 75 (cited in note 10).
19 Under conventional interest analysis, New York has no interest in an accident that
occurred outside New York when neither of the parties is a domiciliary or resident of New
York. See id at 62.
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Arabia was interested.20
II. CRITIQUE
Currie needlessly complicated a simple problem: well-estab-
lished procedures, routinely employed in domestic litigation, make
a presumption of forum law unnecessary. In domestic cases, the
plaintiff's complaint is presumed sufficient until the defendant
challenges it."1 Once the defendant challenges the plaintiff's right
to recover-for example, by making a motion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or its state law counterpart-this "pre-
sumption of sufficiency" disappears, having served its purpose of
allocating the burden of raising the issue. The burden then shifts
to the plaintiff to show that his complaint states a claim-i.e., to
show that some law entitles him to recover on the facts alleged.
The plaintiff can make this showing by citing appropriate legal au-
thorities in papers submitted to the court (in contrast to the more
formal showing required to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of persua-
sion on the facts). Since stating a claim upon which relief can be
granted depends on the existence of supporting law, the plaintiff
must identify the law that entitles him to recover.
To illustrate, suppose that the plaintiff sues a bus company,
alleging that he was injured while riding on the defendant's bus. If
the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of these allega-
tions, the plaintiff can recover by persuading the jury that the alle-
gations are true. But if the defendant does challenge the plaintiff's
right to recover, the presumption that the claim is sufficient ceases,
and the plaintiff must also establish that some rule of law entitles
him to relief if the facts alleged are true. Thus, the defendant may
move to dismiss on the ground that state tort law requires the
plaintiff to allege that the bus driver was negligent. If the court
agrees and the plaintiff cannot in good faith make this allegation,
the plaintiff's claim will be dismissed. If there is some other law
that entitles the plaintiff to recover without proving the bus
" Currie noted that a disinterested forum might consider dismissing without prejudice
on forum non conveniens grounds, but argued that this "will not be an appropriate disposi-
tion in many instances, and it probably would not have been so in Walton," given the nar-
row scope of forum non conveniens. Id at 63.
" See, for example, Brute v Southworth, 611 F2d 406, 409 (1st Cir 1979); Simpson v
Providence Washington Insurance Group, 608 F2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir 1979); Black, Sivalls
& Bryson v Shondell, 174 F2d 587, 590-91 (8th Cir 1949). This article is written from the
standpoint of a challenge to the plaintiff's claim, but the analysis would be the same if the
sufficiency of an affirmative defense were at issue.
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driver's negligence,22 the plaintiff must call this law to the court's
attention. Otherwise, the plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed.
These procedures work just as well in cases with multistate
elements. In Walton, for example, if the defendant had not chal-
lenged the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff could
have recovered without any determination of whether the plain-
tiff's right was based on New York or Saudi law. But the defendant
did challenge the plaintiff's right to recover, persuading the court
that the plaintiff had no right under New York law because the
accident occurred in Saudi Arabia. At that point, the presumption
of sufficiency disappeared, and the burden shifted to the plaintiff
to cite some other law that entitled him to recover. The plaintiff
did not do so, thus failing to establish that his complaint stated a
claim on which relief could be granted. The court, quite properly,
dismissed the case.23
This analysis has two implications. First, it suggests that we
do not need a presumption of forum law to allocate the burden of
raising a foreign law issue-the presumption of sufficiency used in
domestic cases adequately serves this function. 4 Second, and more
broadly, the analysis suggests that there is nothing "normal and
natural" about presuming that forum law applies. (Indeed, I am
astonished that anyone would consider it "normal and natural" for
an Arkansas plaintiff injured in Saudi Arabia to recover damages
from a Delaware defendant under New York law.) On the contrary,
once the applicable law becomes an issue, the "normal and natu-
ral" practice is to require the plaintiff to show that some law enti-
tles him to recover, i.e., to show that some state has an "interest."
22 For example, state contract law might provide that common carriers implicitly agree
to indemnify passengers for any injury.
23 The plaintiff declined the court's offer to stay the proceedings so that he could re-
search Saudi law, choosing instead to risk an appeal on the question of whether New York
law applied. Walton, 233 F2d at 546. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's deter-
mination that New York conferred no right on a plaintiff injured outside of New York. At
that point, it was too late for the plaintiff to argue that he was entitled to recover under
some other state's law. Judge Frank wanted to remand to give the plaintiff an opportunity
to show that he had a cause of action under the law of Saudi Arabia. Id.
24 Indeed, it suggests that the court may not have to "choose" a body of law at any
stage of the trial. In the absence of a challenge to the plaintiff's right to recover, the court
ordinarily will continue to presume that the complaint is sufficient and render a verdict on
that basis. This same presumption applies when the jury is instructed: courts typically use
instructions proffered by the litigants, and these instructions are presumed to reflect the
applicable law unless challenged. See, for example, Black, Sivalls, 174 F2d 587, in which the
plaintiff was allowed to recover although he neither pleaded nor proved an essential element
of the cause of action (privity of contract) because the defendant did not challenge the
plaintiff's right to recover until the trial had concluded.
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There is no need for a presumption of forum law as a default rule
to ensure that some law applies-the conclusion that no state is
shown to be interested is merely another way of saying that the
plaintiff failed to establish a right to relief.
All this seems sufficiently straightforward to ask why Currie
thought that a presumption of forum law was needed. The ques-
tion is especially important because choice of law scholars have un-
critically accepted this aspect of interest analysis. Here is the ex-
planation that Currie offered, after recognizing that New York had
no interest and that Saudi Arabia's interest could not be deter-
mined because its law was unknown:
Law is an instrument of social control. Recognition of this
fact, and emphasis on the economic and social policies ex-
pressed in laws, would lead to a fresh and constructive ap-
proach to conflict-of-laws problems. But law is not an instru-
ment of social control alone. It retains something of the
quality and function that were commonly attributed to it
before we became so acutely conscious of its sociological role.
It is an accumulated body of experience and principle that has
served well, on the whole, as a guide to the adjudication of
disputes between parties in court. Grant that no governmental
policy of New York respecting the problem of personal inju-
ries will be advanced by the application of its law to a dispute
between two foreigners arising out of a collision in Saudi Ara-
bia; grant also that neither party regulated his conduct or
planned his affairs with reference to New York law. The fact
remains that there is a lawsuit pending in a New York court.
The harsh alternative to deciding it according to New York
law is to dismiss it. No conflict of interest among states being
apparent, justice between the parties becomes the sole consid-
eration. Justice between the parties requires a decision on the
merits. And where should the New York court look for a rule
of decision that will do justice between the parties but to the
body of principle and experience which has served that pur-
pose, as well as the ends of governmental policy, for the peo-
ple of New York in their domestic affairs?2"
This explanation is perplexing. What is so harsh about dis-
missing the case on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish
the content of Saudi law? Why is dismissing on this ground har-
25 Currie, Displacement in Selected Essays at 64-65 (cited in note 10) (emphasis
added).
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sher than dismissing on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
prove one of the elements required to recover under New York
law? For that matter, why is it harsher than dismissing on the
ground that New York law bars recovery (which would be the re-
sult if New York law so provided)? Currie's answer is that dis-
missing on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the content
of Saudi law is harsher because it does not constitute a "decision
on the merits." But why not? By failing to establish the content of
Saudi law, the plaintiff failed to show that his complaint stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Dismissing on that basis
is surely a decision on the merits.26
Currie failed to see this because he made the same conceptual
mistake he correctly accused traditional choice of law scholars of
making: he treated "choosing" the applicable law as a threshold
inquiry distinct from "applying" the chosen law. Moreover, Currie
assumed that the court renders a "decision on the merits" only
when it applies a law. It followed that the court must "choose" the
law of some jurisdiction to apply before it can decide the merits of
a case. Usually, this choice can be made by analyzing state inter-
ests-i.e., by determining which states have policies that will be
advanced if their laws are applied. Sometimes, however, state in-
terests provide no useful guidance. Walton is an example: New
York had no interest and the court could not determine whether
Saudi Arabia was interested or not.27
As suggested above, this means only that the plaintiff has
failed to establish his right to recover and that the court should
dismiss. For Currie, however, such a conclusion was premature: the
court could not decide the merits of the plaintiff's claim because it
had not yet chosen a law to govern the dispute. But how is the
court to choose if state interests provide no answer? Currie main-
tained that the court must choose the law that will best do "justice
between the parties." "And," he concluded, "where should the...
court look for a rule of decision that will do justice between the
26 A party who brings an action based on one state's law is ordinarily precluded from
bringing a second lawsuit concerning the same transaction based on the law of another state.
See Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 18 Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4411 at 86 (West, 1981).
2 The other cases that Currie resolved by invoking the presumption of forum law also
present situations where the court cannot choose an applicable law on the basis of state
interests. In an unprovided-for case, for example, neither state has an interest. See note 9.
See also Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L & Contemp Probs 754, 779-
80 (1963) (recommending that a disinterested third state apply forum law if it is not feasible
to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds because there is no basis to choose between the
conflicting interests of other states).
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parties but to the body of principle and experience which has
served that purpose, as well as the ends of governmental policy, for
the people of New York in their domestic affairs?"28 Hence, the
presumption of forum law fills the desideratum created by Currie's
unnecessary assumption that reaching the merits requires an ante-
cedent selection of some law.
Alternatively, one might justify the presumption of forum law
on the ground that the forum has a residual interest in applying its
law to suits in its courts when no other state has an interest. Al-
though Currie did not make this argument, New York's lawmakers
could extend New York law to fill gaps left by other states for the
benefit of anyone who sues in New York. But this would be a
strange way to interpret New York law, since its primary effect is
to encourage forum shopping. Therefore, unless New York law
clearly provides otherwise, it makes more sense to assume that
merely suing in a New York court provides no basis for applying
New York law. The applicable law turns instead on the real world
events that gave rise to the dispute.
CONCLUSION
Currie often criticized traditional theorists for being overly
conceptualistic and, as a result, not very sensible. Indeed, Currie
disparaged the result in Walton because New York law was dis-
placed "not by a contrary foreign law, given preference by the sys-
tem of conflict of laws, but by the mere logic of the system it-
self."' 29 Yet the same criticism can be made of Currie's system,
which applies New York law not because there is any reason for
New York to give the plaintiff a right to recover, but because of
"the mere logic of the system itself"-the logic being that the
court must choose somebody's law to apply before it can dispose of
a case. The presumption of forum law is Currie's default position
for making this choice when no state is shown to be interested. But
Currie's logic is fallacious: "choosing" is not a step that must be
completed before the court can reach the merits, and there is no
reason to insist that the court "apply" some jurisdiction's law. As
" Currie, Displacement in Selected Essays at 65 (cited in note 10). Because the need
to choose an applicable law derives from the assumption that the court cannot render a
decision on the merits until a choice is made, Currie's choice is indifferent to the content of
the law. In Walton, having chosen New York law as the best measure of justice between the
parties, Currie would have allowed the plaintiff to recover. But Currie would have been
equally content to dismiss if the plaintiff had sued in a state whose law barred recovery in
domestic cases.
2, Currie, Displacement in Selected Essays at 4-5 (cited in note 10).
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in ordinary domestic cases, the question in a multistate case is
whether some rule of positive law gives the plaintiff a right to re-
cover, and the answer may be no. But this means only that the
plaintiff is not entitled to relief.
